














M. Brockmeier, C.A. Herok, O. v. Ledebur, P. Salamon 
Institute of Market Analysis and Agricultural Trade Policy  
Federal Agricultural Research Centre 
Bundesallee 50, 38116 Braunschweig, Germany 









Paper prepared for presentation at the 25
th International Conference of Agricultural 















Copyright 2003 by [authors].  All rights reserved.  Readers may make verbatim copies of this 
document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that this copyright notice 





EU Enlargement - A New Dimension
Abstract:
Enlarging the EU presents a tremendous effort with obstacles for old and new member states
especially in the agricultural sector. In this paper, impacts of a new accession round were
analyzed with the help of the comparative-static general equilibrium model GTAP (Global
Trade Analysis Project). The standard version was extended to allow for a better
representation of specific instruments of the Common Agriculture Policy and the EU budget.
To capture detailed effects in new member states, simulations were carried out for 12
candidate countries, the EU-15 and the rest of the world. As for products the focus lies on
agriculture. Scenarios include an enlargement with and without the transfer of direct payments
in the new member states, according to the proposal of the EU commission from January
2002. Simulations in a post-Agenda 2000 environment led to heterogeneous country specific
impacts in the accession countries whereas the changes within EU-15 and the rest of the world
were negligible. Due to adjustments in tariffs, trade balances of the new member states were
deteriorating while welfare effects are positive. Transfer of direct payments led to more
pronounced effects, especially with regard to output and trade. Without direct payments
accession countries would be net contributors to the EU budget. This would change when they
become eligible for this subsidy. In general, the analysis shows the importance of a country
specific perspective.
Keywords: EU enlargement, Common Agricultural Policy, EU budget, GE-modeling
JEL: D58, E62, F15, O52, Q18
1I NTRODUCTION
On 9
th October 2002, the European Commission recommended to close negotiations with 10
candidate countries (EU, 2002a). Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia are now scheduled to join the2
European Union (EU) in 2004. This proposal only leaves Bulgaria and Romania
1 out of the
next enlargement round and forms another milestone in the lengthy process of negotiations.
During the ongoing as well as former EU enlargement rounds agriculture and the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) have always been at the heart of controversial debates. At the end
of January 2002, the European Commission therefore issued a paper that was to serve as the
basis for a common position on the agricultural sector (Commission of the European
Communities, 2002). Here, the issue of direct payments and their transfer to farmers in new
member states is of particular importance.
2 Suggestions contained in the January document
are seen as too expensive by current EU member states, while accession countries criticize
them as inadequate. However, the commission clearly stated that any changes of the proposal
that would lead to an expansion of the EU budget can hardly be expected.
Right from the start, the debate on the next EU accessions has been accompanied by
quantitative research exploring possible effects. The amount of literature has grown and now
includes a variety of analyses using partial equilibrium models (e.g. Münch, 2000; Frohberg
& Hartmann, 2001) as well as general equilibrium models (e.g. Hertel et al., 1997; Nielsen,
1999; Banse, 2000 and Frandsen & Jensen, 2002). However, economy-wide, country specific
analyses including the EU-15 and all accession regions are not available yet. Since the
candidate countries differ widely not only in cultural and geographical but also in economic
terms, research allowing for the examination of regional characteristics becomes more
relevant.
Consequently, the goal of this paper is to determine region specific effects of an EU
enlargement in an overall economic context. Due to its key role in the negotiations and the
large financial support provided by the EU, agriculture forms the focus of the study. The
                                                
1  Turkey is an applicant country but negotiations have not yet started.
2 Direct payments were introduced in the CAP as a part of MacSharry reform in 1992. They were aimed to
partly compensate EU farmers for implemented price cuts. Within the enlargement negotiations it is debated if3
analysis particularly considers the transfer of market support systems to accession countries
and the new proposal of the Commission related to direct payments. Furthermore, it aims to
evaluate interactions between agriculture and other sectors as well as worldwide effects.
2M ETHODOLOGY
Model: Standard version and extensions
EU enlargement affects the entire economy of various countries, which makes a model able to
assess economy-wide effects in an international context necessary. Here, we used the well-
known worldwide, comparative-static, general equilibrium GTAP model. Due to the
comprehensive existing documentation of the standard model framework (Hertel, 1997;
http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap), a detailed presentation of the standard model is not
included in this paper. However, some extensions of the standard methodology have been
implemented. They allow for a better analysis of two topics crucial within the accession
debate, namely agriculture and the financing of the enlargement. We have put special
emphasis on the modeling of quotas, direct payments and set-aside regulations used in the
agricultural sector and equipped the model with a budget module that enables us to calculate
some fiscal effects of the accession process. These extensions are extensively explained in
Brockmeier (forthcoming). However, due to the importance for this paper the budget module
will be described briefly in the following.
The EU budget is introduced in the GTAP model using an innovative Social Accounting
Matrix (SAM). This SAM not only covers the expenditures and revenues of already existing
agents (e.g. producers, government, private household, etc.), but also of the European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). As formulated in EU law (EU, 2002b),
the EU budget receives 90 percent of the import duties for agricultural and non-agricultural
                                                                                                                                                        
farmers in acceding countries are eligible for compensation since they have not experienced these institutional
price reductions.4
products from producers, the private household, the government and the capital account.
Additional revenues result from an endogenously calculated GDP related tax which flows
from the regional household to the EU budget.
3 Here, all EU member countries face an equal
GDP tax rate. Revenues of the EU budget are used to cover agricultural output and export
subsidies as well as direct payments. In contrast to these product specific instruments,
expenditures for structural policies are not covered within the EU budget module. Due to their
characteristics and specific aims, structural funds can not be allocated to certain commodities.
This strongly hampers their implementation into a product specific model like GTAP.
Obviously, revenues of the EU budget from one member country are not identical with the
expenditures the EU budget is spending on the same member country. A comparison of
revenues and expenditures of each member state therefore shows the net transfer that takes
place within the EU financial system. Analogous to capital transfer, the net transfer within the
EU is part of the current account balance which makes up the difference between exports and
imports of goods and services. However, the sum of net transfers of all member countries
equals zero, since the EU budget is balanced via the endogenous GDP tax rate.
In the standard GTAP model EAGGF revenues and expenditures are organized through the
regional household. All components of the EU budget are therefore introduced with the help
of dummy variables allowing an easy shift from regional household to EU budget and vice
versa. Consequently, a preliminary simulation is employed to move the GTAP data base from
the initial situation without an EU budget to an equilibrium where the EU budget is in charge
of the EAGGF. This mechanism is also used when new member countries need to be included
into the EU budget. Furthermore, it allows for analyzing policy options like co-financing the
CAP by EU member states which is frequently discussed in the current debate.
Data
                                                
3  The EU budget also includes a value-added tax, which is neglected in this analysis.5
Until recently, simulations of an EU enlargement with the GTAP model were hindered by the
given regional aggregation. Central and Eastern European countries were subsumed in larger
regions, the Baltic states were part of the Former Soviet Union region and smaller candidates
like Malta and Cyprus only appeared in the large “Rest of the World” aggregate. The newest
GTAP version, with 1997 as base year, now contains 76 countries and 57 sectors including a
variety of countries currently seeking entrance into the EU.
4
Table 1: Selected Aggregation
Regions Bulgaria (BL), Cyprus (CY),Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (ES), Hungary (HU), Latvia
(LT), Lithuania (LI), Malta (ML), Poland (PL), Romania (RO), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia
(SV), European Union (EU), Rest of the World (ROW)
Products CEREALS, OILSEEDS, SUGARPLANTS, OTHCROPS (other crops), CATTLE,
RAWMILK, OTHANIMAL (other animal products), PROCESSAG (meat products,
vegetable oils and fats, processed rice), OTHFOOD (other food products), SUGAR,
CATTLEMEAT, DAIRY, OTHPRIMARY (other primary, 7 sectors) MNFCS
(manufactures, 16 sectors), SVCES (Services, 15 sectors)
Further disaggregation of Central and Eastern European regions, as well as the inclusion of
other accession candidates such as Malta and Cyprus, now allows for a country specific
analysis and helps to detect specific developments in a general equilibrium framework. For
our simulations we chose an aggregation that uses this new data (see Table 1) and allows us to
analyze national characteristics. As for sectors, the focus lies on agriculture.
Simulations
Modeling starts with some preparatory steps necessary to explicitly implement specific CAP
instruments (Table 2). Generally, policy instruments are implemented in the standard GTAP
model via price wedges using PSE (producer subsidy equivalent) information. Milk and sugar
quotas are added, and resulting rents are shifted to producers. Due to the use of the budget
module the direct payments, which are included in the GTAP model as derived numbers, are
subject to minor adjustments to match the exact figures resulting from the Commission of the
European Communities (1998). Preparatory experiments also simulate the impacts of policy
                                                
4  The database used in this paper is a release candidate for GTAP version 5.2, an extended version of GTAP 56
decisions prior to accession. Pertaining to the EU-15 this is particularly relevant for the
implementation of the Agenda 2000.
Table 2: Description of Scenarios
Preparatory simulations
Implementation of EU budget module within EU-15, introduction of quota regime for sugar and milk




EU Enlargement in 2006: Implementation of budget module within EU-27, adjustment of tariffs and
subsidies within the new EU-27, implementation of common trade system and…
  no direct payments  (NoDiPay) uniform premiums on agricultural land  (DiPay)
Recent developments related to the Mid-term Review of the Agenda 2000 indicate that some
changes in the general concept of this reform package may be expected. However, since the
debate is still going on we simulate the initial Agenda 2000 according to the agreement
reached at the European Council in Berlin.
5 The database generated by preparatory
simulations serves as a new database for further simulations. Preliminary results are not
presented here.
Although Romania and Bulgaria presumably will not participate in the next enlargement
round we simulated the accession of all countries currently involved in the negotiation
process. The enlargement is simulated as an adjustment of protection levels in non-
agricultural sectors and a complete transfer of all CAP instruments except direct payments.
Concerning this instrument we differentiate between two scenarios. In the first we assume that
direct payments are not transferred at all (NoDiPay), whereas in the second option farmers in
accession countries will receive 35% of direct payments paid to farmers in the EU-15
                                                                                                                                                        
and currently only available for members of the GTAP consortium. It will become public in the near future.
5  Agenda 2000 is modelled as follows: Direct payments on cereals, oilseeds, milk and beef were adjusted to fit
the Agenda 2000. Reductions in intervention prices for cereals, dairy products and beef were simulated by a
reduction in border protection, and the milk quota was expanded by 2.4 per cent. Set-aside regulations were
implemented using the assumption that the data of GTAP version 5 implies a set-aside rate of 15 per cent
which is lowered by the Agenda 2000. Consequently, the efficiency of land use in the crop sector improves.7
(DiPay). The second scenario is based on the EU Commission paper published in January
2002 where two variations of direct payments are illustrated:
In the first approach, currently used within the EU-15, direct payments are calculated and paid
according to commodity specific premium rights. These premium rights can be based on
animal heads (e.g. suckler cows), production quotas (e.g. milk) or land areas (e.g. cereals). In
the second option, applicable during a transition period, the total amount of direct payments is
calculated in the same way. Distribution of payments to farmers, however, is simplified by
introducing a uniform payment based on total agricultural area.
Table 3: Proposed Premium Rights and Potential Direct Payments in 2006
Arable crops Cattle Calves Extensification Suckler cows Sheep/goats Raw Milk
Proposed premium rights
Cyprus 54098 9030 4520 90 436846 131019
Czech Republic 2221844 424911 179733 231595 90113 56715 2505553
Bulgaria
Estonia 387233 80500 73700 35580 637 27501 562633
Hungary 3553200 202199 104713 143000 133200 1026910 1946333
Latvia 484700 124320 53280 70200 2021 18437 489474
Lithuania 1336233 367484 244200 150000 10043 17304 1459000
Malta 45392
Poland 9207667 2034309 1200625 857700 453314 364000 8875000
Romania
Slovakia 1011627 204062 62841 78348 39708 218360 946150
Slovenia 94192 125107 53617 77921 49067 52355 463333
Total 18350794 3571922 1972709 1648864 778193 2218428 17423887
Potential direct payments (€)
Cyprus 2242578 252840 0 332220 6300 3210818 526893
Czech Republic 204785140 11897508 3145327 17022232 6307910 416855 10076081
Bulgaria
Estonia 15113123 2254000 1289750 2615130 44590 202132 2262629
Latvia 21695899 3480960 932400 5159700 141470 135512 1968420
Lithuania 66883138 10289552 4273500 11025000 703010 127184 5867368
Malta
Hungary 333762736 5661572 1832477 10510500 9324000 7547788 7827178
Poland 600966010 59960652 21010937 63040950 31731980 2675400 35690812
Romania
Slovakia 92794521 5713736 1099717 5758578 2779560 1604946 3804942
Slovenia 11028517 3502996 938297 5727193 3434690 384809 1863294
Total 1349271662 103013816 34522405 121191503 54473510 16305444 69887617
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2002). - EastEurope (2002)8
In our scenario DiPay all candidate countries follow the second approach and distribute their
direct payments as a uniform premium attached to land. Since the paper of the EU
Commission did not provide estimates of direct payments per country and sector, non-official
estimates have to be used. Premium allotments presented in table 3 were summed up over
each country, and an average acreage payment for every new member state was calculated
(not shown). In the following, subsidies in arable crop sectors are derived by multiplying the
average payment with the relevant area, while payments in the animal sectors are allocated
according to the available grassland (Table 4). Additionally, it is assumed that only cattle and
raw milk will be eligible for these subsidies. The distribution of payments between these two
sectors is based on stock data on milk cows and other cattle.
For the two candidate countries Romania and Bulgaria an average acreage premium based on
figures for all other candidate countries is assumed. The allocation across sectors follows the
same approach as in the other accession countries. Since no information about direct payment
is available for Malta, we draw on assumptions. However, pre-simulations have shown that
results for extremely small countries such as Malta are extraordinarily sensitive. Therefore we
decided to exclude Malta from direct payments until more exact information can be obtained.
Table 4: Allocation of Subsidies by Sector Based on a Uniform Acreage Payment
 Source: Commission of the European Communities (2002). - EastEurope (2002). - FAOSTAT.
Ag. Area Cereals Oilseeds Sugarbeets Other Crops Raw milk Cattle
1000 ha
C y p r u s 6 1510100
Czech 4280 102 16 6 7 42 85
Bulgaria 6203 70 17 0 3 82 41
E s t o n i a 1 4 3 4600199
Hungary 6195 181 34 6 8 64 87
L a t v i a2 5 0 87001 1 5 1 2
L i t h u a n i a 3 5 0 2 3 4115 3 5 2 6
M a l t a 1 0000000
Poland 18457 399 15 19 63 158 173
Romania 14798 279 39 6 14 143 177
S l o v a k i a 2 4 4 5 4 0723 2 2 4 1
S l o v e n i a 4 9 550018 1 3
Total 60388 1127 129 40 106 579 664
Mill €9
Output of milk and sugar in the accession countries differs only slightly from the proposed
quotas. Due to the additional uncertainty which exists with regard to the distribution of quotas
to Bulgaria and Romania, it is assumed that quotas are fixed at the current production level.
3R ESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Production effects resulting from an EU enlargement can be summarized in three main
observations: Firstly, results for new member states are very heterogeneous, not only varying
in numbers but also in the general direction. This is mainly driven by the initial differences in
protection. Secondly, production effects for old EU members are of minor importance.
Thirdly, differences between scenario NoDiPay and DiPay with one exception (cereals in
Cyprus) lie in the range of 0-7%. The implementation of direct payments only in some cases
leads to an opposite reaction. Nevertheless, the introduction of this instrument into new
member states most often pulls resources out of manufactures and services into agriculture.
Crop production in accession countries mainly show negative production effects, except for
Cyprus and Malta and, in the cereals sector, Bulgaria, Hungary, Estonia and Slovakia. In the
animal sector different reactions can be observed. Raw milk production is restricted by the
quota regime, production in the cattle sector mainly grows, and other animal products
decrease in the majority of regions. Reactions in the food sectors more or less reflect the
developments in the primary agricultural sector.
With only one exception, Romania, sugar, dairy and cattle meat production show a growth
while other food products decline. Outside the agricultural and food sector, services and other
primary industries experience a reduction in output; in contrast to that manufactures expand.10
Table 5: Changes in Output in NoDiPay (s1) and DiPay (s2) (in %)
6
Product BL CY CZ ES HU LT LI ML PL RO SK SV EU ROW
CEREALS         s1 1.2 61.5 -1.4 6.6 9.1 -8.9 -12.8 189.7 -7.4 -5.3 3.6 -17.0 0.4 0
                          s2 0.7 78.1 -0.2 6.0 11.0 -10.5 -12.4 189.6 -6.0 -5.7 2.9 -17.4 0.3 0
OILSEEDS        s1 -1.1 8.8 -5.6 -7.9 -3.0 -7.4 -10.6 13.8 -10.8 -8.3 -5.6 -2.0 0.2 0.1
                          s2 -0.9 10.3 -3.6 -9.2 2.9 -9.0 -11.3 13.6 -11.3 -3.0 -5.7 -2.0 0.1 0.1
SUGPLANTS    s1 0000 0 0 0 0 0 00 00 - 0 . 3
                          s2 0000 0 0 0 0 0 00 00 - 0 . 3
OTHCROPS      s1 0.6 30.8 -4.7 -7.3 -7.1 -4.5 -6.7 -10.1 -7.2 -8.6 -4.0 -22.1 0.7 0
                          s2 -0.7 28.6 -6.0 -8.9 -12.1 -9.6 -10.3 -10.0 -10.8 -11.4 -6.3 -21.6 0.9 0
CATTLE            s1 -0.2 8.6 -0.1 -0.3 12.1 6.1 0.3 2.2 21.0 2.8 1.4 0.4 -1.7 -0.1
                          s2 0.8 8.5 3.7 1.1 17.9 9.6 1.8 1.8 25.6 8.3 5.6 0.9 -2.1 -0.1
RAWMILK         s1 0000 0 0 0 0 0 00 00 - 0 . 2
                          s2 0000 0 0 0 0 0 00 00 - 0 . 2
OTHANIMAL     s1 0.8 8.3 0.1 -8.4 4.0 -2.8 -6.3 -6.8 -10.1 -3.0 -0.8 -5.6 0.6 0.1
                          s2 0.1 8.1 -0.7 -8.8 -2.5 -7.4 -8.4 -6.7 -11.0 -3.7 -2.2 -7.1 0.8 0.1
OTHFOOD        s1 2.5 -2.4 -4.6 -8.3 -6.7 -10 -25.1 -17.2 -7.3 -34.4 1.2 -18.8 0.8 0
                          s2 2.0 -2.0 -3.7 -7.8 -7.3 -10.8 -25.7 -17.2 -7.1 -34.4 1.3 -18.7 0.8 0
PROCESSAG   s1 6.7 5.9 1.5 0.4 20.9 -9.5 -12.8 34.2 -10.5 -26.2 -1.0 -15.8 0.2 0.1
                          s2 5.9 6.1 1.4 0.7 14 -10.2 -13.3 34.3 -11.2 -26.7 -1.4 -15.5 0.3 0.1
SUGAR             s1 34.0 10.3 12.6 65.3 10.7 59.8 -3.2 179.4 2.3 -33.3 4.4 -6.4 -0.2 -0.7
                          s2 31.5 10.3 13.2 65.0 11.8 60.1 -3.4 179.7 2.2 -33.6 4.4 -6.3 -0.1 -0.6
CATTLEMEAT  s1 18.8 21.7 -1.9 5.4 51.9 0.5 1.2 70.9 16.8 -9.4 1.9 41.8 -0.8 -0.1
                          s2 17.3 21.6 -1.6 6.0 57.7 0.6 0.9 70.6 17.7 -9.2 2.2 41.7 -0.8 -0.1
DAIRY               s1 10.5 15.6 1.9 23.4 16.2 56.2 44.5 115.5 2.1 -11.5 3.2 1.1 -0.1 -0.3
                          s2 10.2 15.5 2.1 23.0 16.6 56.4 43.0 115.6 1.0 -11.7 2.9 1.0 -0.1 -0.3
OTHPRIMARY  s1 -2.1 -2.7 -2.6 -1.5 -4.7 -0.7 -4.4 -1.1 -1.1 -3.8 -8.9 -0.1 -0.1 0.1
                         s2 -4.0 -2.7 -2.8 -1.7 -5.3 -1.4 -5.6 -1.1 -1.5 -5.7 -9.4 -0.1 0 0.1
MNFCS            s1 -0.3 -3.9 7.7 5.1 5.0 12.2 1.8 26.7 2.2 4.6 3.7 5.4 -0.1 0
                         s2 -1.7 -3.9 7.0 4.7 3.6 10.9 -0.6 26.8 0.9 0.8 3.2 5.3 0 0
SVCES             s1 -1.9 -0.4 -3.0 -2.8 -1.7 -3.4 1.5 -10.0 0.4 9.5 -1.9 -0.9 0 0
                         s2 -1.1 -0.3 -2.7 -2.4 -1.2 -2.9 2.2 -10. 0.9 11.3 -1.6 -0.8 0 0
Source: Own calculations.
Without direct payments land prices decline in the largest new member states Poland and
Romania as well as in Lithuania, Malta, and Slovenia while they increase in other countries
(Table 6). As expected, after the introduction of direct payments higher prices for land can be
observed in all regions, except for Slovenia
7. The magnitude of changes shows the importance
of the subsidy. In accession countries this development may lead to social disturbances since a
high proportion of transfers from Brussels would then be received by land owners.
                                                
6  In a few cases, especially in small countries, changes seem to be extremely high. This results from a very low
initial production where small changes in real numbers lead to big changes in percentages.11
Table 6: Changes in land prices in NoDiPay and DiPay (in %)
BL CY CZ ES HU LT LI ML PL RO SK SV EU ROW
NoDiPay 5 234 13 37 33 6 -2 -4 -17 -14 7 -20 0 0
DiPay 44 267 38 53 95 107 85 -4 21 27 53 -6 0 0
Source: Own calculations.
In scenario NoDipay, total trade balances in the new accession states, excluding Bulgaria,
deteriorate (Table 7). This effect is intensified in scenario DiPay. Here we take a closer look
at the results: Again, effects are not very homogenous across products or countries. With only
a few exceptions (Czech Republic, Estonia and Lithuania) trade balance for non-agricultural
goods in new member states are negatively affected. Due to the huge importance of these
sectors, total trade balance effects are largely driven by this outcome. Concerning agricultural
and food sectors, exports of highly subsidized commodities cattle, sugar, cattle meat and dairy
are mainly growing, while the opposite is true for other crops, other animal products as well
as other food products. No general trend can be observed for cereal and processed agriculture;
oilseeds are hardly affected at all. Sugar plants and raw milk are restricted by production
quotas.
The EU-15 and the rest of the world can improve their positions on international markets.
However, looking at the new EU-27 as a whole the overall trade effect is negative. This
results from the lower production in many sectors, especially outside agriculture, as described
above, and changed trade protection. Tariffs are not only reduced within the new EU-27, but
in many cases also between new member states and third countries. This strongly supports
imports into the enlarged EU.
In contrast to trade balance, welfare, measured as equivalent variation, grows in all new
member states. The same accounts for the EU-15 in scenario NoDiPay, while in scenario
DiPay the welfare decreases in this region. This mainly results from the additional direct
                                                                                                                                                        
7  Land prices in Malta are also declining, but since we have not introduced any direct payments in this region
we cannot judge how prices would be affected by this instrument.12
payments given to new member countries (see below) as well as lower positive allocation
effects and higher negative terms of trade effects.
Table 7:  Changes in Trade Balance (TB) and Welfare (EV) (measured as Equivalent
Variation) in Scenario NoDiPay and DiPay (in mill. US$)
BL CY CZ ES HU LT LI ML PL RO SK SV EU ROW
TB       NoDipay 274 -346 -945 -96 -2060 -147 -1892 -298 -5062 -4404 -618 -948 1234 15308
 Dipay (total) -266 -351 -1297 -155 -2556 -209 -2093 -298 -6340 -5624 -770 -975 4620 16310
CEREALS 7 -5 7 6 152 -8 -14 4 -44 -45 12 -35 8 -63
OILSEEDS -2 1 -9 -2 1 -1 -3 0 -5 -4 -3 0 -15 33
SUGARPLANTS 0 0 -1 0 -5 -2 2 0 001014
OTHCROPS -17 63 -82 -22 -155 -21 -64 0 -376 -208 -44 -20 523 215
C A T T L E 10 2 30 - 8110 300 73 13 -2 -422 -16
R A W M I L K 0 0- 2- 1- 1 0 0 0 -2 -1 -1 1 9 -1
OTHANIMAL -3 4 -21 -10 -117 -5 -22 -1 -163 -93 -15 -18 283 162
OTHFOOD -48 -9 -228 -38 -223 -57 -283 -15 -901 -1347 -70 -348 2940 272
PROCESSAG 12 3 32 -2 389 -22 -46 8 -494 -404 -32 -82 232 245
SUGAR 239 -4 114 5 26 10 -3 4 121 -107 5 2 -107 -355
CATTLEMEAT 122 9 -7 3 178 -2 1 6 237 -38 4 85 -497 -199
D A I R Y 3 51 16 04 29 48 8 1 1 0 6 145 -70 12 2 -340 -288
OTHPRIMARY -45 -18 -162 -9 -86 -6 -2 -6 -156 -176 -79 -20 -50 728
MNFCS -140 -136 972 58 -831 59 -815 -40 -2931 -2569 167 -30 -342 4845
SVCES -427 -270 -1993 -185 -1970 -243 -955 -264 -2071 -635 -740 -510 2397 10728
EV      NoDipay 120 132 865 149 1489 93 661 33 2657 1522 603 328 831 -4899
           DiPay 206 133 942 157 1624 101 700 33 3066 1777 621 332 -56 -5221
Source: Own calculations.
Source: Own calculations.
Figure1: Budget Effects for New Member States in Scenario NoDiPay (in mill. US$)
Without direct payments accession countries, obliged to pay a tax on their net domestic
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export and output subsidies provided for by the Agenda 2000. Such a redistribution would be
largely to the advantage of the EU-15 and produce eight new net payers that contribute to the
EU budget. Only Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia would be net
recipients. Biggest contributors within the accession states would be Poland and Romania.
Source: Own calculations.
Figure 2: Budget Effects for New Member States in Scenario DiPay (in mill. US$)
These results of course have to be viewed under the given restrictions. Structural policies, the
so-called second pillar of the CAP, are not included in the calculations. Since they account for
a large part of the total EU budget and are of particular importance for accession countries,
the inclusion of these payments would certainly change the picture.
Introducing direct payments generates higher revenues from Brussels and also in most cases
reduced payments to Brussels due to lower imports from third countries. This effect appears
to be the strongest in Poland. Consequently, with direct payments most countries would
become net recipients, with Hungary, Poland and Romania receiving the largest net transfers.
Generally, we observe that the importance of the new accession countries measured in their
share in EU budget accounts for approximately 5%.
4C ONCLUSIONS
The simulation with an extended version of the GTAP model shows that the accession of ten
new member states into the EU leads to very heterogeneous country specific effects
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states are significant and mainly driven by initial differences in resources and protection. Crop
as well as pork and poultry production in the accession countries mainly goes down, while
output in cattle increases. Highly supported products like sugar, cattle meat and dairy also
experience a production growth. Additionally, in most cases the transfer of direct payments to
new member states tends to shift resources into agriculture. Due to adjustments in the tariff
structure the trade balance deteriorates in most accession countries, which is even more
pronounced when direct payments are introduced. In contrast to this, welfare effects are
always positive for the new member states. Budget effects are strongly depending on the
implementation of direct payments. Without this subsidy most candidate countries would
become net payers, while with this payment they would be net recipients. However, this
analysis does not consider the influence of structural policies transfers and therefore presents
only a part of the total picture. Generally, the analysis has shown the importance of a country
specific perspective. Depending on their initial situation different countries will experience
different outcomes of the accession to the EU; those will most likely be missed in an
aggregated analysis.15
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